Marginal Rates Under the TCJA by Shuldiner, Reed
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
6-25-2018 
Marginal Rates Under the TCJA 
Reed Shuldiner 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, 
Taxation Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Shuldiner, Reed, "Marginal Rates Under the TCJA" (2018). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1992. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1992 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
TAX NOTES, JUNE 25, 2018  1911
tax notes®
SPECIAL REPORT
Marginal Rates Under the TCJA
by Reed Shuldiner
Table of Contents
Comparing Rates Under Old and New 
Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1911
Marginal Rates by Income Type  . . . . . . . . . .1917
Effect of the Phaseout of the QBI 
Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1919
Effect of Capital Gains on Ordinary 
Income Rates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1923
On its face, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-
466) appears to offer an across-the-board 
reduction in individual marginal rates along with 
an additional 20 percent reduction in rates on 
unincorporated business income. Such a 
description oversimplifies the effect of the act. In 
fact, the rate reductions in the TCJA are uneven 
and play out in surprising ways. For example, the 
new rate structure raises rates on some taxpayers 
and shows a strong preference for married 
taxpayers over unmarried taxpayers, expanding 
marriage bonuses and corresponding singles 
penalties.
Examination of the new deduction for 
unincorporated business income suggests that the 
effect of the deduction goes well beyond a 20 
percent reduction in marginal rates on business 
income. The deduction has the effect of not only 
lowering rate schedules but also shifting brackets. 
As a result, rates on business income can drop by 
well over 20 percent, and rates on nonbusiness 
income are also reduced for business owners. On 
the other hand, the phaseouts built into the new 
provision have the opposite effect, increasing 
marginal rates on business and nonbusiness 
income — in some cases to more than 60 percent.
This report also looks at the preexisting rules 
for capital gains and notes the surprising fact that 
the presence of capital gains can increase rates on 
ordinary income, despite the apparent separation 
between the computation of tax on ordinary 
income and capital gains. This leads to odd 
results, such as that in the presence of capital 
gains, increasing ordinary income can lower 
ordinary income rates.
Comparing Rates Under Old and New Law
It is difficult to directly compare rates under 
old and new law because the definition of taxable 
income is not the same. Because my intention is to 
focus on changes to rates and not changes to the 
tax base, I ignore both changes to the definition of 
gross income and changes to itemized deductions. 
I take into account the standard deduction and, 
under old law, one or two personal exemptions 
depending on marital status because I view those 
provisions as integral to the rate structure. I 
assume old-law personal exemptions are phased 
out smoothly over the phaseout range and 
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therefore have the effect of increasing marginal 
rates by approximately 1.1 percent per 
exemption.1 Given that the TCJA generally 
increased gross income and reduced itemized 
deductions, my calculations overstate the benefits 
of new law.2
For the time being, I also assume that none of 
the income consists of capital gains or qualified 
business income. The treatment of both types of 
income is discussed extensively below. It is also 
necessary to specify filing status. For this section I 
compare rates for married individuals filing joint 
returns (hereinafter simply “married”) and for 
unmarried individuals other than heads of 
households (hereinafter “unmarried” or 
“single”). Doing so allows me to focus not only on 
changes in marginal rates but also on changes to 
marriage penalties and bonuses. In subsequent 
sections, for ease of presentation, I limit the 
analysis to married taxpayers.
Figure 1 shows marginal rates for married 
taxpayers as a function of taxable income under 
old law (Line A) and new law (Line B).3 As 
expected, marginal rates are almost always lower 
under new law by an amount that ranges from 1 
to 9 percentage points. The exceptions are for the 
10 percent and 35 percent brackets, which are 
unchanged over substantial regions.4
1
1.1 percent = 33 percent * $4,150/$125,000. For married taxpayers, the 
phaseout is partially in the 35 percent bracket, implying an effective rate 
of 1.2 percent per exemption, or 2.4 percent for a married couple. I do not 
take into account the overall limitation on itemized deductions, which 
would increase the marginal rate an additional 0.99 percent to 1.19 
percent depending on the taxpayer’s bracket.
2
Others have looked at the overall impact of the tax changes by 
income level. See, e.g., Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, 
“Distributional Analysis of the Conference Agreement for the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act” (Dec. 18, 2017).
3
All figures are based on 2018 numbers. For new law, the rate 
schedule is provided in section 1(j). For old law, the rate schedule takes 
into account inflation adjustments for 2018 as determined before the 
enactment of the TCJA. See Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-45 IRB 489.
4
If the phaseout of the personal exemptions is ignored, the new 35 
percent bracket includes a region of the old 33 percent bracket and 
therefore represents an increase in marginal rates under new law.
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Figure 2 shows marginal rates for unmarried 
taxpayers. As with Figure 1, Line A represents old 
law, and Line B represents new law. Figure 2 
suggests a different story for unmarried 
taxpayers. As with married taxpayers, the 10 
percent bracket is mostly unchanged, and tax 
rates are reduced in the old 15 and 25 percent 
brackets. Starting in the old 28 percent bracket, 
however, the relationship between new law and 
old law flips. For an extended range of income, 
from the start of the new 32 percent bracket (an 
adjusted gross income of about $170,000) to the 
start of the old 35 percent bracket (an AGI of about 
$430,000),5 the rates under new law exceed the 
rates under old law.6
Figure 3 shows the tax savings under new law 
relative to old law as a function of AGI. Line 
A shows the savings for married taxpayers, and 
Line B shows the savings for unmarried 
taxpayers. Line C is explained below. As before, I 
focus only on rate changes, the repeal of the 
personal exemption, and the standard deduction.
The savings for married and unmarried 
taxpayers are starkly different. For married 
taxpayers, the tax savings line is relatively 
straight, rising at roughly a constant percentage of 
income. For unmarried taxpayers, the savings 
initially rise in proportion to AGI, but at about 
$170,000 the savings start to fall and drops close to 
zero at about $430,000. This drop in tax savings 
for unmarried taxpayers follows from the fact that 
marginal rates are higher in this range under new 
law. After about $430,000 the new rates are lower 
than old rates, and the tax savings begin to rise 
parallel to, but well below, the savings for married 
taxpayers.
5
The old 35 percent bracket is difficult to see in Figure 2 because it 
extends from an AGI of $431,450 to only $433,200 before increasing to 
39.6 percent.
6
There is a minor exception. In the AGI range from about $205,000 to 
$220,000, the old rate is 33 percent and the new rate is 32 percent.
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Why were unmarried taxpayers treated more 
harshly than married taxpayers? Presumably, that 
decision came from a desire to further reduce 
marriage penalties implicit in the rate structure. 
Explaining the changes requires a little 
background. The question of how marriage 
should affect tax liability has been a long-standing 
problem for the federal income tax. In an 
individual-based system, such as the Social 
Security payroll tax, tax liability is independent of 
marital status. In a system of joint filing, however, 
the tax effect of marriage will depend on the size 
of the married brackets relative to the unmarried 
brackets, and on the relative income of the two 
individuals.
If the married brackets are equal to the 
unmarried brackets, marriage will have no effect 
on a single-earner couple but will generally 
increase the tax liability of a two-earner couple. 
This marriage penalty will be largest for equal-
earner couples. At the other extreme, if the 
married brackets are equal to twice the unmarried 
brackets, marriage will have no effect on an equal-
earner couple but will generally decrease the tax 
liability of an unequal-earner couple. This 
marriage bonus will increase the more uneven the 
earnings of the two individuals, and it will be 
largest for single-earner couples.
In between the extremes of equal brackets and 
double brackets, the mix between marriage 
penalty and marriage bonus will depend on the 
balance of income between the two individuals. 
The more equal their incomes, the more there will 
tend to be a marriage penalty. The more unequal 
the incomes, the more there will tend to be a 
marriage bonus.
The flip side of a marriage bonus is, of course, 
a singles penalty (and the flip side of a marriage 
penalty is a singles bonus). Thus, there is an 
unavoidable trade-off: the narrower the married 
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
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brackets, the greater the marriage penalty; the 
wider the married brackets, the greater the singles 
penalty. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1969, there 
were not separate rate schedules for married 
filing jointly and unmarried individuals, but 
rather a single rate schedule for individuals.7 
Married individuals filing jointly were taxed on 
twice the tax computed on half their joint income.8 
The effect was to make implicit married brackets 
that were twice the unmarried brackets, creating 
large marriage bonuses and singles penalties. In 
response to complaints from singles, Congress 
introduced the current structure with explicit rate 
schedules for married filing jointly and 
unmarried taxpayers. The relative size of the 
married and unmarried brackets varied over time 
and across brackets. In TRA 1986 Congress 
compromised and set married brackets at 167 
percent of the unmarried brackets.9 The effect of 
that compromise along with a relatively flat rate 
structure was to moderate both the marriage 
bonus (singles penalty) and the marriage penalty 
(singles bonus).
Over time the compromise broke down in two 
ways. As more and more married couples became 
dual earners and tax rates rose after TRA 1986, 
complaints about the marriage penalty grew. 
Congress responded in 2001 by moving back to 
the 200 percent standard, but only at lower 
income levels.10 For married taxpayers, the 
standard deduction, the newly introduced 10 
percent bracket, and the existing 15 percent 
bracket were each set to double the unmarried 
amounts.11 At the other end of the income scale 
there was severe bracket compression. In an 
extreme example, when President Clinton called 
for a 10 percent surtax on “millionaires” in 1993, it 
was triggered at $250,000 for both married and 
unmarried taxpayers.12
By 2018 the relationship between the brackets 
was set to be as shown in Table 1. Only the 25 
percent bracket remained at 167 percent, the TRA 
1986 standard. The lower brackets and the 
standard deduction were each set at double for 
married taxpayers. The upper brackets went in 
the opposite direction. The 28 percent, 33 percent, 
and 35 percent brackets were set at 122 percent, 
100 percent, and 113 percent of their respective 
individual brackets. Thus, old law was a 
combination of no marriage penalty and generous 
marriage bonuses at lower income levels with 
significant marriage penalties at upper income 
levels.13 Using 2018 inflation-adjusted figures, the 
maximum marriage penalty because of the rate 
structure had risen to more than $34,000. Also, the 
threshold for the overall limitation on itemized 
deductions for married taxpayers was set at only 
120 percent of the unmarried level, potentially 
adding about $2,500 to the marriage penalty.14
The TCJA greatly expanded the marriage 
bonus region and correspondingly shrank the 
marriage penalty. Under new law, all brackets up 
until the 35 percent bracket have married cutoffs 
that are 200 percent of the unmarried cutoffs.15 It is 
only the line between the 35 percent and 37 
percent brackets where a marriage penalty 
remains. For unmarried taxpayers, the 37 percent 
bracket starts at $500,000, while for married 
taxpayers the bracket starts at $600,000, only 120 
percent of the unmarried level. Thus, the 35 
percent married bracket ends $400,000 short of the 
7
See section 1 before amendment by section 803(a) of TRA 1969 (P.L. 
91-172). There was a second rate schedule for heads of households.
8
See section 2 before amendment by section 803(b) of TRA 1969.
9
Compare section 1(a), with section 1(c) as amended by section 101(a) 
of TRA 1986 (P.L. 99-514), and see section 63(c)(2) as amended by section 
102(a) of TRA 1986.
10
Congress had earlier responded by enacting a two-earner 
deduction in 1981. See former section 221, added by section 103 of the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34). The deduction was 
repealed in 1986. See section 131(a) of TRA 1986.
11
See sections 63(c)(2), 1(i)(1), and 1(f)(8) as amended by sections 301, 
101, and 302, respectively, of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-16).
12
Compare section 1(a), with section 1(c), as amended by section 
13201(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66). 
The 39.6 percent bracket represented a 10 percent surcharge on the 36 
percent bracket. See Gwen Ifill, “Few to Pay More in Income Taxes, 
President Insists,” The New York Times, Feb. 17, 1993, at A1 
(“Administration officials said such a tax would probably affect only 
millionaires.”).
13
In this report I consider marriage penalties only from the rate 
brackets, the standard deductions, and a few key phaseout provisions. 
There are other examples of marriage penalties and bonuses throughout 
the code. In particular, the earned income tax credit imposes substantial 
marriage penalties on low-income taxpayers. See section 32.
14
$2,535 = 39.6 percent * (3 percent * (2 * $266,700 - $320,000)). The 
personal exemption phaseout also had a marriage penalty, but by the 
time a couple’s income reached the level necessary to trigger the 
maximum marriage penalty, the personal exemptions would have been 
fully phased out regardless of whether they were married. See sections 
151(d)(3)(A) and 68(b)(1).
15
The repeal of the overall limitation on itemized deductions further 
shrinks the marriage penalty. See section 68(f).
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$1 million that would be available to two high-
earning single individuals.
Under new law, a marriage penalty can occur 
for two individuals only if their combined taxable 
income exceeds $600,000, and the maximum 
marriage penalty is $8,000, less than one quarter 
the maximum penalty under old law.16 Along with 
a reduction in marriage penalties for relatively 
16
$8,000 is equal to the 2 percent rate differential between the 37 
percent and 35 percent brackets times the $400,000 difference between 
the married bracket and twice the single bracket. The TCJA also 
eliminated the marriage penalty in the phaseout of the child credit. 
Compare section 24(h)(3) (threshold of $400,000 for married taxpayers is 
200 percent of $200,000 threshold for unmarried taxpayers), with section 
24(b)(2) (threshold of $110,000 for married taxpayers is 147 percent of 
$75,000 threshold for unmarried taxpayers).
Married Versus Unmarried Brackets and Related Provisions Under Old and New Law
Rate
Married Bracket 
Ends
Unmarried Bracket 
Ends
Ratio Married/
Unmarried
Old law brackets
10% $19,050 $9,525 200%
15% $77,400 $38,700 200%
25% $156,150 $93,700 167%
28% $237,950 $195,450 122%
33% $424,950 $424,950 100%
35% $480,050 $426,700 113%
39.6%
New law brackets
10% $19,050 $9,525 200%
12% $77,400 $38,700 200%
22% $165,000 $82,500 200%
24% $315,000 $157,500 200%
32% $400,000 $200,000 200%
35% $600,000 $500,000 120%
37%
Married Unmarried
Ratio Married/
Unmarried
Old law amounts
Standard deduction $13,000 $6,500 200%
Personal exemption phaseout threshold $320,000 $266,700 120%
Section 68 threshold $320,000 $266,700 120%
New law amounts
Standard dedution $24,000 $12,000 200%
Personal exemption phaseout threshold N/A N/A N/A
Section 68 threshold N/A N/A N/A
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
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equal-earner couples, the TCJA increased 
marriage bonuses for unequal-earner couples. 
Under old law, the maximum marriage bonus was 
$13,373.17 Under new law, the maximum marriage 
bonus has increased substantially to $30,750.18 The 
TCJA has come close to returning to the pre-TRA 
1969 treatment of married couples.
It was because of marriage penalties being 
decreased and marriage bonuses increased that 
rate reductions for unmarried taxpayers 
necessarily had to be less generous than rate 
reductions for married taxpayers. After all, the 
flip side of a marriage bonus is a singles penalty. 
Consider again Figure 3, this time comparing Line 
A with Line C. Line A, remember, shows the tax 
savings for a married couple. Line C shows the tax 
savings for an equal-earner unmarried couple 
with the same aggregate income. The two lines are 
identical up until an AGI of $177,450. That is the 
point at which under old law an equal-earner 
married couple hit the top of the 25 percent 
bracket and began to pay a marriage penalty.19 The 
TCJA’s removal of the marriage penalty meant 
that from that point on, the act’s treatment of 
married couples was relatively more generous 
than its treatment of unmarried couples.
Marginal Rates by Income Type
The analysis so far has compared marginal 
rates and tax burdens on ordinary income under 
the TCJA and prior law. In this section, I broaden 
the focus on the TCJA to consider marginal rates 
on different classes of income, examining in 
particular the new qualified business income 
(QBI) deduction’s effect on marginal rates.20 
Section 199A provides a deduction for 20 percent 
of QBI. It is natural to think of the provision as 
simply reducing marginal rates by 20 percent. For 
example, the 35 percent bracket would become 
the 28 percent bracket. In fact, the situation is 
more complicated. Because section 199A operates 
by reducing taxable income, it can have the 
secondary effect of shifting the taxpayer into a 
lower bracket, and the rate reduction for QBI can 
therefore exceed 20 percent. Moreover, the 
reduction in taxable income can shift the rate 
bracket for other types of income, both ordinary 
income and capital gain. As a corollary, the 
marginal rate on all types of income depends on 
the balance of business income to nonbusiness 
income. That makes any discussion of marginal 
rates more complicated.
For example, consider two taxpaying couples, 
both married with no children, both taking the 
standard deduction, and both with $24,000 of 
ordinary income offset by the standard 
deduction. I use the term “ordinary income” here 
to refer to income such as wages and interest that 
qualifies for neither long-term capital gains rates 
nor the QBI deduction under section 199A. 
Assume the first couple, whom I call Wage 
Couple, has additional wages of $77,400. Assume 
the second couple, whom I call Business Couple, 
has additional QBI of $77,400.
Wage Couple will be at the threshold of the 22 
percent bracket. Therefore, their marginal rate on 
incremental income will be:
By contrast, Business Couple will still be well 
within the 12 percent bracket because they will get 
a deduction of 20 percent of their business 
income. Therefore, their taxable income will be 
only $61,920. Their marginal rate on incremental 
income will be:
Business Couple’s 9.6 percent marginal rate on 
QBI represents a 45 percent reduction in Wage 
Couple’s 22 percent marginal rate on ordinary 
income, rather than a 20 percent reduction as 
17
The maximum bonus was reached under old law when an 
individual earning at least $493,050 married an individual with zero 
income because it allowed full use of the married standard deduction 
and all brackets below 39.6 percent.
18
The maximum bonus is reached when an individual earning at 
least $624,000 marries an individual with zero income because it allows 
full use of the married standard deduction and all brackets below 37 
percent.
19
The top of the 25 percent bracket was $156,150. Adding the 
standard deduction ($13,000) and two personal exemptions ($4,150 each) 
gives a total of $177,450.
20
In this section I assume that the W-2 constraint is not binding and 
that the business activity is not a specified service trade or business. See 
section 199A(b)(2) and (d)(2). I consider those restrictions infra.
Ordinary income 22 percent
Business income 17.6 percent (80 percent * 22 percent)
Capital gains 15 percent
Ordinary income 12 percent
Business income 9.6 percent (80 percent * 12 percent)
Capital gains 0 percent
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might be expected. Moreover, Business Couple’s 
marginal rate on ordinary income, such as interest 
on a savings account or wages, is 10 percentage 
points lower than Wage Couple’s rate on the same 
income. And Business Couple could earn more 
than $15,280 in capital gains and pay no tax, while 
Wage Couple would pay $2,292 in capital gains 
tax on the same income.21
Figure 4 shows marginal rates on incremental 
ordinary, business, and capital gains income for 
married taxpayers whose baseline income is 
either ordinary or QBI. Lines A, C, and E (the solid 
lines) assume a baseline of ordinary income (like 
Wage Couple), and lines B, D, and F (the dashed 
lines) assume a baseline of QBI (like Business 
Couple). Consider first the solid lines that assume 
an ordinary baseline. Line A is simply the 
statutory rates in section 1(j) and shows the 
marginal rate on $1 of additional ordinary 
income. Line C shows the marginal rate on $1 of 
business income given that all other income is 
ordinary and is simply 80 percent of Line A. 
Finally, Line E is the marginal rates on $1 of capital 
gains given a baseline of ordinary income. Line E 
reflects the capital gains rates and brackets in 
section 1(h) as amended by section 1(j)(5).
Now compare the dashed lines that assume a 
QBI baseline. In each case the assumption is that 
other than $24,000 of ordinary income offset by 
the standard deduction, all income is QBI. As a 
result, taxable income is reduced by 20 percent, 
which has the effect of shifting the rate brackets to 
the right. The rightward shift is by a constant 
factor of 1.25 and therefore increases with income. 
Moreover, the rate brackets are shifted to the right 
not only for business income (Line D) but also for 
ordinary income (Line B) and capital gains (Line 
F). The new QBI deduction thus offers a double 
benefit: It not only lowers the marginal rate within 
each bracket but also delays the start of each new 
21
$15,280 = $77,200 - $61,920. See infra note 40 (discussing the fact that 
the 15 percent bracket starts at $77,200 rather than $77,400, as might be 
expected).
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bracket. And this second benefit is shared with 
ordinary income and capital gains.22 Figure 4 
shows the brackets on incremental income 
assuming that QBI makes up all (dashed lines B, 
D, and F) or none (solid lines A, C, and E) of the 
taxpayer’s baseline income. If the taxpayer’s 
baseline income consists of a mix of ordinary 
income and QBI, the start of each bracket will be 
shifted somewhere between the solid and dashed 
lines.
Effect of the Phaseout of the QBI Deduction
The discussion so far has assumed away 
significant constraints on the QBI deduction. In 
this section I focus on two constraints: the 
treatment of specified service businesses and the 
W-2 constraint. To generate QBI, a business 
cannot be a specified service trade or business.23 A 
specified service trade or business is a trade or 
business described in section 1202(e)(3)(A), 
applied without regard to the words 
“engineering” and “architecture,” or a business 
that involves the performance of services 
consisting of investing and investment 
management; trading; or dealing in securities, 
partnership interests, or commodities.24 Section 
1202(e)(3)(A) includes:
any trade or business involving the 
performance of services in the fields of 
health, law, [engineering, architecture,] 
accounting, actuarial science, performing 
arts, consulting, athletics, financial 
services, brokerage services, or any trade 
or business where the principal asset of 
such trade or business is the reputation or 
skill of 1 or more of its employees.25
The statute, however, provides an exception 
to the specified service disallowance based on the 
taxpayer’s taxable income (computed without 
regard to the section 199A deduction).26 For 
married taxpayers, the specified service exception 
does not apply if taxable income is less than 
$315,000, and the deduction is phased out on a pro 
rata basis between $315,000 and $415,000.27 Any 
time there is a phaseout of a tax benefit (or phase-
in of a tax penalty), the effect is to increase 
effective marginal rates over the phaseout range. 
The computation of marginal rates is made more 
complicated given that the W-2 constraint is 
phased in over the same range over which the 
exception to the specified services disallowance is 
phased out. For now, I assume that the W-2 
constraint is nonbinding and therefore can be 
ignored. Below, I consider the effect of a binding 
W-2 constraint.
The specified service phaseout affects the 
marginal rate on both ordinary and business 
income as long as the taxpayer has any business 
income. The extreme case is when all the 
taxpayer’s income (beyond the standard 
deduction) is business income. In that case the 
effective marginal rates on incremental ordinary 
and business income in the phaseout range can be 
expressed as follows:
tord = t§1(TI) (1 + 0.2 B/R)
tbus = t§1(TI) (1 - 0.2 (Θ + R - B)/R + 0.2 B/R)
TI = B (1 - 0.2 (Θ + R - B)/R)
where,
tord, tbus effective marginal rate on 
incremental ordinary and business 
income
t§1(TI)  statutory marginal rates on 
ordinary income at the current level of 
taxable income
TI  taxable income after the allowance of 
the section 199A deduction
B  the amount of QBI (all of which is 
assumed to come from specified service 
activities)
Θ, R  the phaseout threshold and range
22
Although not shown, the effects on unmarried taxpayers are 
qualitatively similar.
23
See section 199A(d)(1)(A).
24
See section 199A(d)(2).
25
Section 199A(d)(2)(A) also modifies the rule in section 1202(e)(3)(A) 
to consider the reputation of owners as well as employees. Read literally, 
a specified service business includes a firm providing engineering or 
architectural services so long as the principal asset of the firm is the 
reputation of its employees or owners. That interpretation would likely 
treat most engineering and architectural firms as specified service 
businesses and would not seem to be the intent of the drafters.
26
See section 199A(d)(3) and (g)(2)(B).
27
See section 199A(d)(3) and (e)(3). The phaseout threshold and range 
for unmarried taxpayers is half of the amounts for married taxpayers.
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In both cases, the term t§1(TI) (0.2 B/R) reflects 
the increase in tax liability because of the pro rata 
loss of the QBI deduction over the phaseout 
range. For the effective marginal rate on business 
income, tbus, the additional term t§1(TI)(0.2(Θ + R - 
B)/R) reflects the reduction in marginal rates from 
the non-phased-out portion of the QBI deduction.
Figure 5 shows the effect of the phaseout on 
effective marginal rates. Consider first the left 
portion of the graph up to $315,000 in pre-
deduction taxable income, the threshold for the 
specified service phaseout. Given the assumption 
that the taxpayer’s baseline taxable income is all 
QBI, the left portion of the graph is identical to 
lines B, D, and F (the dashed lines) in Figure 4. 
Line A of Figure 5 shows the marginal rate on 
ordinary income and is a shifted version of the 
statutory rate tables. Line B shows the marginal 
rate on business income, and its height is simply 
80 percent of the solid line. Line C shows the 
unshifted statutory ordinary income rate for 
reference purposes. For example, Line C jumps 
from 12 percent to 22 percent at $77,400, while 
Line A jumps at $96,750.28
At $315,000, the phaseout of the QBI 
deduction starts, and it continues for $100,000 
until income reaches $415,000. Once income 
exceeds $415,000, the QBI deduction has been 
fully phased out. At that point the effective rate on 
both ordinary and (specified service) business 
income have merged with the statutory rate on 
ordinary income.
The range of greatest interest is the phaseout 
range. Starting at $315,000, for every $1,000 
dollars in incremental earnings — whether 
ordinary or business earnings — the taxpayer 
loses 1 percent of the entire QBI deduction. That 
has the effect of immediately increasing the 
marginal rate by about 15.1 percentage points, 
leading to marginal rates of 39.1 percent on 
ordinary income rather than the statutory rate of 
28
$96,750 = 1.25 * $77,400.
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24 percent. Incremental business income is taxed 
at a rate of 34.3 percent.29 Capital gains income 
does not trigger the phaseout of the section 199A 
deduction because taxable income for this 
purpose does not generally include capital gains.30
The marginal rates in the phaseout range are 
not constant, however, continuing to climb 
between $315,000 and $415,000. As can be seen 
from the graph, the marginal rate on each type of 
income creeps up and then jumps in two steps, 
like a poorly constructed staircase with tilted 
treads and uneven risers. The upward slope 
between the jumps is generated because as the 
amount of business income increases, so does the 
tax cost of phasing out the deduction. The jumps 
are caused by the lagged increases in the statutory 
rate. For example, there is a jump at about 
$357,000 of QBI that is a delayed reaction to the 
increase in statutory rates from 24 percent to 32 
percent that occurs at a taxable income of 
$315,000. The 8 percentage point increase in the 
statutory rate causes a 13.7 percentage point 
increase in the effective marginal rate on ordinary 
income and a 12.8 percentage point increase in the 
effective marginal rate on business income.
By the end of the phaseout range, the marginal 
rates have risen substantially, with the rate on 
both ordinary and business income rising to a 
peak of 64 percent.31 Note that the effective rate 
increases with both the rate of the business 
deduction and the phaseout threshold. In the 
version of the TCJA originally passed by the 
Senate, the deduction rate was 23 percent and the 
phaseout began at $500,000.32 Under the Senate 
bill, the effective marginal rate would have been 
as high as 83 percent.
So far, I have effectively ignored the W-2 
constraint by assuming it is not binding. Section 
199A limits the QBI deduction from each qualified 
business to the greater of:
• 50 percent of the W-2 wages; and
• 25 percent of the W-2 wages plus 2.5 percent 
of the unadjusted basis of qualified 
property.33
As with the specified service exception, the W-
2 constraint is phased in for married taxpayers 
between $315,000 and $415,000 of taxable income, 
determined without regard to the section 199A 
deduction.34 The allowable deduction during the 
phaseout range is the weighted average of the 
unconstrained and constrained deductions, with 
the weights based on the percentage of the way 
through the phaseout range. Assuming the W-2 
constraint is binding, the deduction during the 
phaseout range can be expressed as the following 
formula:
(1 - p) (0.2B) + p (W2)
where:
p  the percentage of the way through the 
phase-in region35
B  the amount of QBI
W2  the amount of the W-2 constraint
If the business is also a specified service 
business, the specified service disallowance and 
the W-2 constraint are phased in at the same time. 
The QBI deduction can then be expressed as:
(1 - p) ((1 - p) (0.2B) + p (W2))36
Figure 6 shows the effect of both the phase-in 
of the W-2 constraint and the phaseout of the 
specified service allowance on the amount of the 
QBI deduction. Figure 6 assumes that after an 
amount equal to the standard deduction, all the 
taxpayer’s income is from a qualified business. 
Line A shows the section 199A deduction without 
regard to either limitation — it is simply 20 
29
15.1 percent = 24 percent * (0.2 * $315,000/$100,000). 34.3 percent = 
80 percent * 24 percent + 15.1 percent.
30
See section 1(h). See the discussion of capital gains in the next 
section for a description of how section 1(h) operates.
31
64 percent = 35 percent * (1 + (0.2 * $415,000/$100,000)).
32
See the version of section 199A(a)(2) and (e)(2)(A) in section 11011 
of H.R. 1, as passed by the Senate on December 2, 2017. The effective rate 
decreases with the length of the phaseout range. The phaseout range was 
the same in the Senate bill and the final legislation.
33
See section 199A(b)(2)(B). The term “W-2 wages” is defined to 
include both wages and elective contributions to section 401(k) plans 
and similar plans. See section 199A(4)(A), cross-referencing section 
6051(a)(3) (wages within the meaning of section 3121(a)) and section 
6051(a)(8) (elective deferrals). Nonelective deferrals are not counted.
34
See section 199A(b)(3).
35
p = (Taxable Income - Threshold)/Range. The expression (1 - p) is 
defined as the “applicable percentage” by section 199A(d)(3)(B).
36
See section 199A(d)(3)(A)(ii) (providing a rule for the interaction 
between the specified service phaseout and the W-2 constraint phase-in). 
If the income is from a specified service business and the W-2 constraint 
is not binding, the allowable deduction is (1 - p) (0.2B).
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percent of income. Line B shows a hypothetical 
W-2 constraint arbitrarily set at $30,000.
Lines C, D, and E show the phaseout or phase-
down of the deduction under different 
assumptions. Line C assumes that the W-2 
constraint is binding at $30,000 and that the 
income is not from a specified service business. 
Line D assumes the W-2 constraint is not binding 
but that the income is from a specified service 
business. The specified service phaseout is more 
steeply sloped than the W-2 constraint phase-in 
because of the assumption that the W-2 constraint 
is greater than zero. If the W-2 constraint were 
zero (rather than $30,000), lines C and D would be 
identical. Both are bowed out because the amount 
of business income is assumed to be increasing 
and, therefore, the underlying deduction is 
increasing while it is being phased out. Line E 
assumes both that the W-2 constraint is binding at 
$30,000 and that the income is from a specified 
service business. The combined phaseout is 
steeper than the phaseout from either provision 
taken alone and is bowed in because of the 
interaction effect of the two restrictions.
Figure 7 shows the marginal rates on ordinary 
and business income that flow from the 
assumptions that the W-2 constraint is fixed at 
$30,000 and that all the income (after the standard 
deduction) is from a specified service business. 
Figure 7 should be compared with Figure 5, which 
shows the same information assuming that the W-
2 constraint is not binding. As shown in Figure 6, 
the effect of the combination of the specified 
service phaseout and the phase-in of a binding W-
2 constraint is to accelerate the phaseout of the 
deduction. This acceleration results in a front-
loaded increase in the effective marginal rate. As 
the phaseout progresses, the effective rate 
declines steeply, only to jump up again as each 
new partially shifted bracket is entered. At the 
start of the phaseout, the taxpayer is in the 24 
percent bracket but faces a marginal rate on 
ordinary income of 47 percent. The marginal rate 
on ordinary income declines to 44 percent and, at 
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the start of the 32 percent bracket, jumps up again 
to 58 percent. It then declines steeply to 45 
percent. At the start of the 35 percent bracket, the 
marginal rate jumps to 49 percent and declines 
again to 46 percent by the end of the phaseout 
range. The marginal rates for QBI are lower but 
follow the same pattern, reaching a peak of 55.4 
percent.
The shape of the marginal rate curve depends 
on the assumed W-2 constraint. In the extreme, if 
the W-2 constraint is zero, the marginal rates on 
ordinary income in the phaseout range would 
look a little steeper than in Figure 7, with slightly 
higher peaks for ordinary income of 54 percent 
and 62 percent for the 24 percent and 32 percent 
brackets, and a lower peak of 42 percent 
corresponding to the 35 percent bracket. The peak 
rate on QBI would be 59 percent. Between a 
constraint of $30,000 and no constraint, the shape 
of the marginal rates shifts gradually from that 
shown in Figure 7 to that shown in Figure 5.
Effect of Capital Gains on Ordinary Income Rates
The discussion in the previous sections 
focused on the effects of the QBI deduction and 
the interaction between that deduction and 
marginal rates on other types of income. It makes 
clear that there can be complex and presumably 
unintended interactions between the marginal 
rates on different types of income. It also 
emphasizes that the statutory rates are just a 
starting point in determining effective marginal 
rates. In this section I examine whether there are 
similar interactions between the special rates on 
capital gains and the marginal rates on ordinary 
income. I show that there is in fact an interaction 
and provide a few examples of how it can play 
out.
First, it is worth reviewing the basic rules for 
the taxation of capital gains, which were not 
substantially changed by the TCJA. Generally, 
under section 1(h), tax is computed by first 
subtracting net capital gains (defined to include 
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qualified dividends) from taxable income to 
calculate ordinary taxable income.37 Tax on 
ordinary taxable income is computed based on 
the section 1 ordinary rates. Tax on net capital 
gains is computed at three rates: 0 percent, 15 
percent, and 20 percent.38 Under prior law, the 
starts of the 15 percent and 20 percent capital 
gains brackets were tied to the starts of the 25 
percent and 39.6 percent ordinary income 
brackets.39 Under the TCJA, the capital gains 
brackets have become unmoored from the 
ordinary income brackets. For married taxpayers 
in 2018, the 0 percent bracket ends at $77,200, and 
the 15 percent bracket ends at $479,000.40 In 
determining the rate on capital gains, however, 
net capital gains are stacked on top of ordinary 
taxable income. In other words, ordinary taxable 
income effectively displaces lower-bracket capital 
gains. Total tax liability is the sum of the tax on 
ordinary taxable income plus the tax on net 
capital gains.41
Given that capital gain income is stacked on 
top of ordinary income, it is not surprising that 
increasing a taxpayer’s ordinary income can 
increase the taxpayer’s marginal rate on capital 
gains. For example, if a married couple has 
$70,000 of taxable income, their marginal rate on 
capital gains is zero. If the couple earned an 
additional $10,000 in ordinary income, their 
marginal rate on capital gains would be increased 
to 15 percent.
By contrast, given that the tax on ordinary 
income is computed after subtracting capital gain 
from taxable income, it might seem that the 
amount of capital gains would have no effect on 
the marginal rate on ordinary income. That facile 
conclusion is false as can be seen by a simple 
example comparing two couples, Ordinary 
Couple and Capital Couple. Ordinary Couple has 
ordinary taxable income of $70,000 and no capital 
gain. Their marginal rate on ordinary income is 12 
percent based on their statutory bracket. Capital 
Couple has the same $70,000 in ordinary income 
but also has $10,000 in capital gains. Consider the 
effect on Capital Couple’s tax liability of earning 
another $1 of ordinary income. As with Ordinary 
Couple, their marginal rate on ordinary taxable 
income based on the ordinary tax brackets is 12 
percent. Thus, the direct effect of earning another 
$1 is a tax of 12 cents. But there is also an indirect 
effect: The additional $1 of ordinary income 
displaces $1 of capital gains that had been taxed at 
0 percent and pushes it into the 15 percent capital 
gains bracket, thus increasing Capital Couple’s tax 
liability by another 15 cents. Combining both the 
direct and indirect effects, the addition of the 
capital gains income increases Capital Couple’s 
effective marginal rate on ordinary income to 27 
percent rather than the 12 percent rate faced by 
Ordinary Couple.
The size of the indirect effect is determined by 
the difference between the marginal rate on the 
taxpayer’s last dollar of capital gain and the 
marginal rate on their first dollar of capital gain, 
and it can take one of four values: 0 percent, 5 
percent, 15 percent, or 20 percent. The indirect 
effect is 0 percent when the first and last dollar of 
capital gains are in the same bracket. It is 15 
percent or 20 percent when the first dollar is in the 
0 percent bracket and the last dollar is in the 15 
percent or 20 percent bracket, respectively. The 
indirect effect is 5 percent when the first dollar of 
capital gain is in the 15 percent bracket and the 
last dollar of capital gain is in the 20 percent 
bracket. For QBI, the indirect effect would be 80 
percent of the indirect effect for ordinary income 
because each dollar of QBI displaces only 80 cents 
of capital gains.
Taking into account the indirect effect of 
capital gains on ordinary income leads to 
surprising implications, of which I suggest three. 
First, increasing the amount of capital gains can 
increase the marginal rate on ordinary income. 
Second, increasing the amount of ordinary 
37
Net capital gain is defined by section 1221 (netting rules) and 
section 1(h)(11) (inclusion of qualified dividends).
38
I am ignoring special categories of net capital gain that are taxed at 
25 percent and 28 percent. See section 1(h)(6) (unrecaptured section 1250 
gain) and 1(h)(4) (28 percent rate gain). I am also ignoring any effects 
that operate through increasing AGI.
39
See section 1(h)(1)(B)(i) and (C)(ii)(I).
40
See section 1(j)(5). Oddly, the 15 percent capital gains bracket starts 
at $77,200, while the 22 percent ordinary income bracket (the former 25 
percent bracket) starts at $77,400. Compare section 1(j)(5)(B)(i), with 
section 1(j)(2)(A). The effect is to create a brief range where the capital 
gains rate of 15 percent exceeds the ordinary rate of 12 percent.
41
Although not usually expressed this way, the tax on capital gains 
can be computed as the tax on all taxable income at capital gains rates 
minus the tax on ordinary taxable income at capital gains rates. Total tax 
liability, therefore, can be computed as the tax on ordinary taxable 
income computed at ordinary rates plus the tax on all taxable income at 
capital gains rates minus the tax on ordinary taxable income at capital 
gains rates.
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income can decrease the marginal rate on 
ordinary income. Third, holding total income 
constant, increasing the proportion of income in 
the form of capital gains can increase the marginal 
rate on ordinary income.
The first implication is shown by the example 
of Ordinary Couple and Capital Couple. Adding 
$10,000 in capital gains to Ordinary Couple 
turned them into Capital Couple and increased 
their marginal rate on ordinary income from 12 
percent to 27 percent by increasing the indirect 
effect from 0 percent to 15 percent.
A slight modification of the same example can 
be used to show the second implication — that 
increased ordinary income can lead to lower 
marginal rates. Assume that Capital Couple earns 
an additional $10,000 in wages. Their ordinary 
income will now be $80,000 and place them in the 
22 percent bracket. Looking only at this direct 
effect, their marginal rate on ordinary income will 
have increased 10 percentage points. But given 
their increased ordinary income, their first and 
last dollar of capital gain are now in the same 
bracket and, therefore, the indirect effect will have 
dropped from 15 percent to 0 percent. Taking both 
effects into account, their marginal rate will have 
dropped from 27 percent to 22 percent because of 
earning another $10,000 of ordinary income.42
The third claim — that holding income 
constant, increasing the percentage of capital gain 
can increase the marginal rate on ordinary income 
— can be shown by a similar comparison. 
Compare two couples, each with $80,000 of 
taxable income. Assume the first couple has 
$78,000 in ordinary income and $2,000 in capital 
gain, while the second couple has $70,000 in 
ordinary income and $10,000 in capital gain. The 
first couple will face a marginal rate on ordinary 
income of 22 percent, consisting of a direct effect 
of 22 percent and no indirect effect. The second 
couple with only $70,000 of ordinary income will 
face a marginal rate of 27 percent: a direct effect of 
12 percent from applying the ordinary rate 
brackets, and an indirect effect of 15 percent from 
having capital gain straddling the 0 percent and 
15 percent brackets. Thus, the couple with a 
smaller proportion of ordinary income will have 
the higher tax rate on ordinary income.
These surprising results all flow from the way 
that capital gains are stacked on top of ordinary 
income. They demonstrate how, as the tax code 
becomes ever more complex, its different parts 
can interact in unexpected ways. 
42
As a more extreme example, if the couple’s ordinary taxable income 
was increased from $70,000 to $77,200 (rather than to $80,000), they 
would still be in the 12 percent bracket, and their direct marginal rate on 
ordinary income would still be 12 percent, while their indirect effect 
would be 0 percent. Thus, the addition of $7,200 in ordinary income 
would have lowered their marginal rate on ordinary income from 27 
percent to 12 percent.
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